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1. INTRODUCTION
Family law, also known as personal status laws, refers to the area of law which regulates the
formation of marriage, divorce, marital property rights, child custody, inheritance, and spousal duties.
Political scientists have highlighted the interconnectedness between patterns of state-building and the
development of family law. An epic moment in state-building occurs when laws are enacted that regulate
the private lives of individuals, facilitating the nationalization of family affairs. In North Africa and the
Middle East, some countries adopted family law legislation fairly easily after winning state sovereignty,
while others experienced great difficulty enacting similar laws for many years following independence.
The extent to which family law content was regressive or progressive also varied significantly among
North African and Middle Eastern countries. This study aims to demonstrate how family law reflects the
struggle among various social and political forces to capture the state and assert authority in the statebuilding process. The balance of state power between competing traditional and modernizing forces
impacts both the timing (short-term versus long-term struggle) and type (progressive or regressive) of
family law after independence. Previous work has shown how societal-state relations, institutional
legacies and styles of governance help determine family law content. This study identifies an additional
explanatory variable for family law content: the struggle for power among different forces seeking to
assert authority over the state. The ability of one of two competing forces, broadly categorized as
traditionalists versus modernists, to capture the state is necessary for codification and is predictive of
family law content. Case studies reveal that systemic shocks (e.g. revolution, social unrest, or foreign
intervention) tip the balance of power in favor of traditional or modernizing forces in the postindependence state-building process and facilitate the successful consolidation of power and codification
of family law. Systemic shocks refer to actors, events or crises outside of the state apparatus which
disrupt the status quo. This study demonstrates that family law outcomes in the post-independence era is
a not simply the fixed result of regime type, colonial history, or institutional legacy, but is also the result
of a dynamic struggle for power, the outcome of which can largely be determined by the presence of such
significant systemic shocks.
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State capture by traditionalist forces over modernizing forces (or vice versa) is necessary for the
codification of family law on a national level. Furthermore, family law content, whether progressive or
regressive with respect to equality between men and women, depends on the style of state-building
adopted by the group in power. State-building styles can be categorized in either one of two ways. First,
the state may be captured by modernizers and undergo transformative state-building. Transformative
state-building occurs when the goal is to build a single national identity, and weaken sub-state forces.
The transformative project leads to progressive family law and rejects the social practices of sub-state
actors in the tribal hinterland. Alternatively, the state may be captured by traditionalists (traditional,
ethnic, religious or sectarian groups) and undergo accommodative state-building. Accommodative statebuilding occurs when the goal is to strengthen sub-state forces. The accommodative project leads to
regressive family law and affirms the social practices of sub-state actors in the tribal hinterland. The first
independent variable of interest, state capture by traditional or modernizing forces enabled by the
presence of a systemic shock- affects the timing of successful codification. Rapid codification after a
short-term struggle among various forces reflects both early and effective control of the state by one side
or the other, whereas long-term struggle over codification results in gridlock for an extended period of
time. The second independent variable, state-building style- accommodative or transformative- affects
the type of family law. Transformative state-building promotes the weakening of sub-state tribalism and
the coding of progressive family law, while accommodative state-building promotes the strengthening of
sub-state tribalism and the coding of regressive family law.
Previous work has not clearly identified the importance of systemic shocks in the shaping of
family law outcomes resulting from domestic power struggles. While quantitative and qualitative studies
have shown that institutional legacies, state-societal relations and styles of governance are reflected in
family law content (e.g. communism, theocratic regimes, colonial rule, and state-tribal alliances), this
study stresses the dynamism of competing forces struggling to capture the state. I argue that the ability of
either the modernizers or traditionalists to capture the state (at the expense of the other) in the presence of
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a systemic shock eliminates policy gridlock, allowing for more rapid codification of family law. I define
‘state capture’ as the ability of either the modernists or traditionalists to assert authority and influence the
state apparatus. The assertion of authority is made evident by the successful enactment of particular statebuilding agendas. For modernists, the agenda would be the building of an impersonal and modern nationstate, and for traditionalists, the agenda would be the reinforcement of a status quo system with sub-state
sectarian, ethnic and religious concentrations of power. I further argue, as supported by the literature, that
the content of family law is progressive or regressive for women depending on the state-building visions
of the beneficiaries of state power and the styles of state-building, accommodative or transformative,
adopted by such power holders.

Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework

4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Family Law and State Formation
Academics who study changes in gender policy write extensively about the political struggles
which take place between monarchs or presidents and their “bases of power,” distinct and usually
powerful social groups in society, whether ethnic, tribal, sectarian or religious, which support the regime
at the expense of a more broad, democratic consensus (Charrad, 1997; Hinnesbusch, 2003; Tilly, 2007).
Authoritarian leaders rely on such segments of the population for political support and often maintain
their place of power with clientelist networks, offering favors in exchange for votes or approval.
Political scientists have argued that this characteristic of the Arab authoritarian government plays itself
out in gender politics, and that family law itself is often a reflection of the preferences of such social bases
of power (Manea, 2011). Charrad (2001) demonstrates that state autonomy from tribal groups or state
alliances with tribal groups determines family law content. Charrad argues that the pre-colonial and
colonial histories of North African countries structurally delimited a range of possible family law
outcomes. This study suggests that the importance of state capture by traditionalists or modernists, made
possible through the presence of significant systemic shocks, is an important determinant of the presence
or absence of state-tribal alliances, and thus family law content. As will be demonstrated, major political
and economic shocks tipping the balance in favor of one state-building vision over another have great
implications for family law formulation.
In some contexts, such as in Tunisia in the 1990’s or Iraq in the 1980’s, feminist movements may
also play a role in politics and the shaping of gender policy (Charrad, 1997; Efrati, 2005). Rather than
focusing on the ongoing and continuous process of gender policy formation in Middle Eastern countries,
an important process which has received much attention, this article deals with the impact of acute events
occurring in the midst of post-colonial struggle for state power on the codification and evolution (or
devolution) of family law. States in these contexts may fall short of Max Weber’s conception of a state,
which he defines as having a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Instead, these states are marked by
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the erection of an “institutional image” (Manea, 2011) as well as a centralized “rational-legal”
administrative body, so that only one dimension of the Weberian state is fulfilled. In addition, I adopt a
definition of the state formulated by Migdal (1994) which conceptualizes the state as a dynamic, rather
than fixed, entity: “As the state organization comes into contact with various social groups, it clashes with
and accommodates to different moral orders…The state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it
embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups.” Thus, while
institutional legacies profoundly affect the makeup of a state structure, state-societal relations are in a
constant state of flux. Traditional and modernizing forces which shape the state-building visions of the
state apparatus may emanate from as broad a range as a foreign government, tribal groups or a trade
union.
Family law is relevant to state-building because it was once law which did not fall under the
jurisdiction of the state (Glendon, 1989). Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon (2011) note, “family law is a
barometer of the strength and scope of state power. Some state-building projects smashed traditional
religious laws and customs. Other leaders preserved religious and customary family law to consolidate
their power. Both projects used women’s status in family law as an instrument”(7). The state’s ability to
gain enough administrative power and political legitimacy to regulate family law is tied to the statebuilding process. Many socialist regimes which adopted projects of modernization sought to secularize
society and promoted gender equality (Molyneux 1985; Kandiyoti, 1991; Johson 1983). The communist
ideology is identified as a particularly powerful political tool used by the state to transform social
organization, and the principles of the communist doctrine are incidentally opposed to the economic and
social subordination of women. Communist governments adopted egalitarian and secular family laws,
leaving behind a legacy of gender equality (legally) throughout the Soviet bloc, as well as in China,
Vietnam and Cuba (Hazard, 1939; Berman, 1946; Molyneux, 1985; Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe,
1985). In contrast, the political legacy of colonialism has been charged with creating fragmented legal
systems in which customary and religious laws are codified. Htun and Weldon (2011) note that British
colonial rule, “institutionalized religious dominion over religious customary laws. This policy forged a
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symbolic linkage between the public status of a communal group on the one hand, and the preservation of
a ‘traditional,’ ‘authentic’ vision of its family law on the other.” In India, the newly independent
government under Nehru retained the British policy of codifying separate family laws for the different
religious groups in order to allay Muslim fears of Hindu domination (Williams, 2006). This exemplifies
the admonishment from Huntington (1968) about the struggle that states with weak institutions and strong
social forces face when trying to establish rule of law and political legitimacy. States with weak
institutions and inadequate political legitimacy undergo accommodative state projects, consolidating their
power by bargaining with and empowering religious and cultural sub-state groups (Charrad, 2001;
Williams, 2006).
Trends in family law formulation and reform are closely related to “church-state relations, the
consolidation of state power, and the assertion of cultural identity” (Htun and Weldon, 2011). Family
law, codified in Morocco in 1958, Pakistan in 1961, Jordan in 1976, and Algeria in 1984, institutionalized
female subordination and adhered to classical Sharia law (Esposito and Delong-Bas, 2001.) The national
codification of oppressive social norms in personal status laws may indicate the central state’s inability to
escape the influences of religious or traditional sources of authority. In many Muslim-majority societies,
personal status laws have been used by the government to codify the cultural and religious norms of
traditional bases of power in order to gain state legitimacy (Manea, 2011).
The process of state-building is often characterized as consisting of disruptive and tumultuous
social transformation (Huntington, 1968; Moore, 1967). Specifically, national structures emerge at the
expense of local or traditional structures, a transition which is highly contentious. While the process of
nationalization may play out differently within various contexts around the world, the basic plot of a
central government struggling for political legitimacy remains fairly consistent (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; Tilly, 2007). Many Middle Eastern and North African countries suffer from the ‘legitimacy deficit’
and must undergo accommodative state-building projects, which means negotiating with sub-state cultural
and religious groups (Hinnesbusch, 2003; Anderson, 1986). These negotiations are reflected in the family
law preferences of those cultural and religious groups, and in turn the regime is able to win political
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support and overcome the legitimacy deficit (Charrad, 2001; Manea, 2011). In addition, when the state
adopts policies of modernization- industrialization, urbanization, expansion of free media, education, and
increased literacy- relegating half the population to spheres of domesticity is not conducive for
development (Khoury and Moghadam, 1995). External factors such as war may trigger the need for state
modernization and administrative wherewithal through expanded bureaucracy (Moghadam, 1988). In the
case of Iraq in the 1980s, the demand for female labor rose during the war with Iran due to increased
manpower needs and an expanding state apparatus (Lorenz, 1991).

2.2 Tribal Interpretations of Islamic Family Law
Islamic family law is not tantamount to regressive family law. There is variation among countries
in the extent to which the laws oppress women or advance their interests, and such variation occurs within
the framework of Islamic law. Turkey is the only country in the Middle East to adopt a completely
secular stance. The regressive content of some personal status codes stem from more tribal and
traditional interpretations of Islamic Law. Just as modernization serves a purpose for state expansion and
incorporation into the global economy, the subordination of women serves the needs of tribal solidarity.
Islamic law, as well as the customary law of many tribes, generates a family structure largely based on the
male bloodline, referred to in anthropology as the agnatic lineage. Within the patrilineal kinship
structure, the socially meaningful ties within a given kin grouping are the male ties. Kinship is defined
centrally by the unilineal descent of the agnatic line (Charrad, 2001). Traditional forms of agrarian or
hinterland social organization emphasize the predominance of the patrilineal extended family in order to
maintain group solidarity and cohesion. Mourina Charrad explains:
Two contradictory principles historically have operated at once: a principle of unity, based on ties
among men in the agnatic lineage, and a principle of division, introduced by the necessity to
accept in the kin group a number of women from other lineages. The particularism of conjugal
units represents a potential threat to the solidarity of the agnatic kin group, since conjugal units
may break away from the group and thus bring division (51).
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Agnatic lineages view marital bonds as potential threats of division to the unity of the extended kin
grouping because new members (women) must be accepted from outside kin groups to propagate the
bloodline. Marriages may also be used to build economic and political alliances between kin groupings
and clans, giving way to tribal federations.
Kinship has been the main form of social organization in the Maghib and has also pervaded social
organization throughout the rest of the Middle East historically. Islamic laws are designed to protect the
solidarity of the patrilineal kin group through laws of inheritance, marriage, divorce, property, filiation
and personal obligation which favor the male members of the family structure. The patrilineage shows a
preference for keeping women within the kin group, and thus kin endogamy (marriage within the kin
group) is highly valued since it prevents the fragmentation of property. Father-brother-daughter (FBD)
marriages increase the size of the lineage because the lineage of the woman’s father retains her children.
Lastly, family reputation depends on the purity of the wives and daughters, a belief which lends great
importance to the practice of veiling and gender segregation. A man’s ‘ird’ (honor) is a collective
responsibility for all men in the lineage, and the veil protects women from non-kin males. The conjugal
relationship between man and wife is important only insofar as the unilineal descent of the male line may
continue. Wives are seen as outsiders taken in from different kin groupings, and daughters are not as
valuable since they will eventually be given away for marriage. Both historically and to some extent
contemporaneously, such kinship structures and patrilineal bloodlines in the MENA region have been of
tremendous political importance for the fortification of power within and among kinship groupings
throughout the Middle East (Charrad, 2001; Beck and Keddie, 1978). While kinship groupings and tribal
alliances may not be as common in many countries today as compared to the first part of the 20th century,
the religious and customary norms stemming from such structures of kinship persist, and are mitigated
through processes of modernization. Modernization through industrialization, urbanization, and
education within a state seeking to incorporate women into rapidly growing economies works to dislodge
the legacies of patriarchal and customary laws (Mogahadam, 1992). The entire tribal and sectarian social
structure is built upon a system of alliances and social insulation. Marriage is the mechanism through
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which tribal membership and alliances are regulated. Women, therefore are an important political tool in
tribal politics, and must be regulated.
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

3.1 North Yemen: Systemic Shocks, State Capture and Family Law Codification
This article was primarily inspired by an analysis of the evolution of family law in North Yemen
prior to unification by Elham Manea (2011). Manea suggests that the “politics of survival” as a result of
social fragmentation was the primary cause for the fragmentation and regressive nature of family law. In
addition, another key point can be gleaned from the political history of North Yemen: the systemic shock
of a foreign intervention spurred by a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Egypt determined family law
outcomes by facilitating state capture by traditionalists or modernists. The case of North Yemen prior to
unification demonstrates how family law fluctuated between reformed codification and oppressive
codification throughout the duration of the proxy conflict depending on which side exerted greater control
over the state. Saudi Arabia empowered traditionalists subscribing to tribalism, while Egypt offered
military assistance to the socialist-minded Free Officers working to topple the monarchy and institute a
government amenable to the eventual enactment of a pan-Arab nation. In contrast, South Yemen was
politically and militarily backed by the Soviet Union, and the government enacted laws which befitted the
socialist vision of society, offering greater legal equality for women. The fact that family law codification
reflected the nature of the military struggle in North Yemen speaks to the relationship between the
dynamic struggle to capture the state among various forces and family law codification.
The Yemen case study raises two important points regarding the codification of family law and
its content. First, the legal status of family affairs depended on whether the modernizers (the Free
Officers) had more influence over the state or whether the traditionalists (tribal leaders) had more
influence over the state. Ultimately, the traditionalists captured the state and regressive family law was
put into place. Second, foreign intervention by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, engaged in a proxy war, had a
big impact on the domestic politics of North Yemen. This suggests that in the occurrence of significant
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systemic shocks, such as foreign intervention or international war, the balance of power can be tilted to
favor one side over the other, and the ability of one side to capture or influence the state is facilitated.
The state-building styles of the beneficiaries of state power are incorporated into family law. Once the
state was able to stabilize and the traditionalist forces consolidated power, a regressive family law
emphasizing tribal preferences prevailed through a project of accommodative state-building. The case of
Yemen suggests that state capture by a particular social force (modernizing or traditional) facilitated by
the presence of a systemic shock factors into the politics of family law formation.

3.2 Timing of Successful Codification and the Struggle to Capture the State
I hypothesize that failure of either modernizing or traditional forces to capture the state in
the absence of some systemic shock leads to policy gridlock and the absence of family law codification.
In turn, I hypothesize that successful capture of the state facilitated by some systemic shock, and the
assertion of authority by traditional or modernizing forces leads to the subsequent codification of family
law due to the fact that effective control of the state apparatus by one side is made possible. Table 1
shows that among countries with post-independence traditionalist-modernist struggles for power,
experience with direct colonization, and prolonged, violent wars for independence, Tunisia and Morocco
were the only two countries to codify family law immediately following independence, whereas Iraq,
Libya and Algeria all experienced delayed codification of family law.1
In my analysis of codification timing, the independent variable is state capture by modernizing or
traditional forces, measured through the ability of one side to influence the state, assert authority and
weaken opposing forces. Case studies shed light on the importance of systemic shocks for determining
the outcome of such struggles to consolidate power. The dependent variable is the timing of successful
codification of family law. I examine cases in which successful codification was accomplished rapidly
1

Syria was not characterized by a traditionalist-modernist struggle. Syria emerged from the colonial period
with a state dominated by traditional forces, resulting in the continuation of fragmented, regressive family law
promulgated during the colonial period, and the enactment of a new regressive Syrian code seven years after independence.
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after independence as well as cases in which codification was delayed and accomplished many years
following independence. I hypothesize that Morocco and Tunisia codified family law and declared
independence simultaneously due to the fact that the capturing of the state by dominant forces in the
midst of struggle was achieved immediately, while state capture by traditionalists or modernists in Iraq
and Algeria occurred much later.

3.3 Regressive vs. Progressive Family Law
Previous literature has shown that the state may establish itself through 'accommodative state-building' or
'transformative state-building,' and that such styles of state-building will be reflected in regressive or
progressive family law, respectively. I hypothesize that states captured by modernizers seek to undergo
projects of transformative nation-building and modernization, and will adopt unified, progressive family
law. In turn, states captured by traditional forces which draw their stability from the status-quo by
undergoing accommodative state-building projects will adopt regressive family law. In short, the second
independent variable of interest predicting family law content is whether the state adopts transformative

(modernizing domination) or accommodative (traditionalist domination) state-building behavior.
The second dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the codified laws
are regressive or progressive.
Table 3.1 Case Selection

Country

Year of
Country
Independence

Regressive or
Progressive
Family Law

Direct or
Indirect
Colonial Rule

Year that
Family Law
was First
Codified

Timing: Delayed versus
Immediate

Countries with violent independent struggle
Iraq

1932

Progressive

Direct

1959

Delayed

Syria

1946

Regressive

Direct

1953

Delayed

1

Libya

1951

Progressive

Direct

1972

Delayed

Morocco

1956

Regressive

Direct

1957

Immediate

Tunisia

1956

Progressive

Direct

1956

Immediate

Algeria

1962

Regressive

Direct

1984

Delayed
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1

Libya codified only inheritance rights laws in 1959.

The goal is then to bridge the theory that state capture by traditional or modernizing forces, made
possible by the presence of systemic shocks which tilt the balance of power, is reflected in family law
policy with the current literature which states that state-building patterns are reflected in the family law
content. If actors subscribing to the vision of the modernizers capture the state, then the state will be
characterized by the policies of the modernizers, reducing the oppressive nature of sub-state tribal family
law. In turn, if actors subscribing to the vision of the traditionalists capture the state, the state will be
characterized by accommodative state-building, affecting the area of family law accordingly.

3.4 Case Selection
Middle Eastern and North African Countries may be divided into three categories based on
historical experiences with colonization. The first category includes the Gulf States which were sparsely
populated, resource-abundant, tribal states governed by ruling families and held together by a system of
status-quo, patronage networks. These countries signed international treaties which allowed the British
government access to natural resources and control over foreign policy. The second category includes
states which experienced foreign intervention only insofar as they were given protectorate status. These
states were required to maintain foreign policies which served the interests of the French/British
governments, but had relatively high levels of autonomy over domestic policy. Party systems, elections,
laws, and administration were sometimes in place long before official independence was declared. The
third category is the countries which experienced direct colonization as well as prolonged, violent wars
for independence. The governments of these states were comprised of colonial officials and both
domestic and foreign policies were tightly controlled. It is the post-independence experience of the third
category which is of interest to this study. Countries falling under this category include Morocco,
Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Libya and Iraq. Among these countries, Syria is the only country to have

13
emerged from the colonial period with no significant traditionalist-modernist power struggle. I will
conduct short case studies of four countries each representing one of four possible configurations:

Table 3.2 Family Law Timing and Type in Selected Cases

Type
Timing

Regressive

Progressive

Rapid

Morocco

Tunisia

Delayed

Algeria

Iraq

4. CASE STUDIES: MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA AND IRAQ

4.1 Morocco: Tribal-Monarchy Coalition and the fall of the Istiqlal Nationalist Party
Prior to French colonization, Morocco experienced a great deal of tension between the central
government and the tribal hinterland. Clifford Geertz (1971) notes that pre-colonial Morocco was divided
into two worlds. The first was the ‘land of government’ which was full of state officials, market
inspectors, religious judges, and administrative representatives of government. It was a world where the
authority of the sultan was recognized. The second world was the ‘land of dissidence’ which possessed
no such representatives of the sultan, and fought aggressively to preserve tribal autonomy (Abu-Lughod,
1980; Charrad, 2001). Additionally, the Sultan constantly threatened tribal independence by imposing
taxes through force, causing the chasm between ‘the land of government’ and ‘the land of dissidence’ to
widen. Waterbury (1970) describes Morocco in the pre-colonial period as “a stable system of continuous
violence…[the sultan] collect[s] taxes to pay the army to crush the tribes to collect still more taxes.” The
relationship between the tribal periphery and the royal core underwent a profound transformation due to
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the politics of Moroccan decolonization, and the bitter rivalry between the tribal hinterland and the
Sultanate soon sweetened into a strategic alliance.
Toward the end of the colonial period, Morocco’s struggle for independence was led largely by
the urban-based Istiqlal (meaning “independence” in Arabic) party. Throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s,
the Istiqlal was the main organization leading the anti-colonial fight, and by 1947 the party had fifteen
thousand members (Abun-Nasr, 1975). The leader of Istiqlal, Allal al-Fasi, was sent into exile from 1937
to 1946, a move which infuriated supporters and led to expansion of the party base.2 The Istiqlal party
drew most of its support from urban, commercial and religious establishments in the cities. The party
platform was a fusion of modern nationalism and religious revivalism, and the French viewed the growing
nationalist movement as a threat to colonial power. Charrad (2001) writes:
The Istiqlal succeeded in mobilizing urban areas such as Fez, Casablanca, and Rabat. Its
implementation in tribal areas, by contrast, was virtually nonexistent, thus leaving open the
possibility for counter-mobilization. The French colonial regime seized the opportunity. The
French responded to the predominantly urban-based Moroccan nationalism by manipulating tribal
notables in rural areas as a counterweight to the urban nationalists. As in their other colonies,
French colonial authorities resorted to direct repression against nationalist leaders, whom they
arrested or sent into exile. In addition, when the French decided that it was time to use force
against the nationalists, they found allies among some tribes and rural notables.
French support for tribal notables led to the formation of a coalition of warriors, led by the
powerful leader al-Glawi, against the Istiqlal and the sultan. In 1953 the tribal coalition circulated a
petition among tribal notables asking the French resident general of the colonial state to “deliver the
people from the extremists of the Istiqlal party and from whoever [helped] them” (Hermassi, 1972). In
1953, al-Glawi marched on the cities of Fez and Rabat with Berber warriors as a show of force against the
Istiqlal and the sultan (who was allied with the nationalist party.) Al-Glawi traveled throughout the
country and demanded the removal of the sultan and the smashing of the Istiqlal, declaring, “If, contrary
to our expectation, [the French government] does not show the firmness which the Moroccan people
expect of it, France will lose her place in Morocco” (Abun-Nasr, 1975). When the sultan refused to

2

See Henry Munson Jr., Religion and Power in Morocco (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 78-79 and
Mohamed El Mansour, “Salafis and Modernists in the Moroccan Nationalist Movement,” in Islamism and
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distance himself from the nationalists, the French deposed him 1953 and sent him into exile. Charrad
(2001) writes, “With several tribal groups helping the French and forcefully opposing the Istiqlal, it was
unlikely that the party would become the uncontested voice of the Moroccan nation.” The decolonization
process had ensured that the Istiqlal, a party embracing a modernizing vision of state-building, was left
politically weak and ineffective.
In 1956, the alliance between the French colonial government and the tribal coalition rapidly
unraveled as violence began to take hold in many Moroccan cities. The poorly organized Moroccan
Liberation Army attacked French military units in several regions, and urban riots became widespread. In
the midst of the Algerian conflict, the French colonial government was unenthusiastic about the prospect
of being sucked into another war of attrition, and granted Morocco independence on 2 March 1956.
Following independence, the Alawi dynasty, despite several hundred years of weak leadership, became
the only possible point of agreement for Moroccan unity. After the illegitimacy of foreign colonial rule,
the sultan drew legitimacy “from the history of the Moroccan sultanate, which combined temporal and
spiritual power, even though its power had been historically rejected by the tribes. The sultan belonged to
the Alawi dynasty, which first established itself in the mid-1600s and traced its descent to the Prophet
Muhammad through bloodlines” (Charrad, 2001; Combs-Schilling, 1989). Moroccan independence was
therefore consolidated under the leadership of the monarchy, and when the sultan was returned from
exile, the ‘land of dissidence’ recognized his authority and he became the king of newly sovereign
Morocco. However, despite the King’s former association with the Istiqlal, the dominance of the tribal
hinterland as the result of French military and political intervention, and his desire to keep the urbanbased elites from curbing the power of the monarchy, compelled the King to forge an alliance with tribal
leaders. The traditionalists had emerged from the colonial period unopposed by any formidable
modernizing force, and the Istiqlal party quickly receded into the background. As a result, a family code
was promulgated immediately, the same year that independence from the French was achieved.
The decolonization process in Morocco changed the relationship between the tribes and the
monarchy by incorporating tribal groups into the national framework. Prior to colonial occupation the
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hinterland had desired complete autonomy from the central government. Once the French had given
tribal notables a stake a national politics by offering them administrative posts, military support, and
political backing, tribal politics became prominent in post-independence political life (Gellner, 1972).
The monarchy responded by isolating the urban-based modernizers and adopting an accommodative style
of state-building. Tribal notables were embraced as allies and a system of patronage was put in place to
secure the allegiance of the rural areas. Charrad (2001) writes: “As long as the system of patronage in
tribal areas continued to provide power at the center, it was not to the advantage of the Moroccan
monarchy to engage in any policy that might hasten the disintegration of tribal solidarities.” One
historian refers to the post-colonial countryside as the “defender of the throne,” against the urban political
elites who sought to potentially curb the power of the throne should they gain control of government
(Leveau, 1976). The monarchy granted rural notables easy credit, subsidies and tax relief in exchange for
political support. Tribal notables could, in turn, mobilize rural communities based on kin ties in response
to unfavorable political developments. (Gellner, 1972; Eikelman, 1985). Thus, through a strong alliance
between the monarchy and the rural traditionalists against the urban elites, the Moroccan regime remained
stable and the modernizers remained weak. Traditionalist forces successfully captured the state and
immediately formulated family law legislation after independence which reflected the preferences of substate tribalism and social organization.
State capture by traditionalist forces and the accommodative style of state-building adopted by
the monarchy paved the way for a vision which sustained the tribal framework of society on a national
level, leading to the codification of regressive family law. The fierce opposition of the tribal areas to the
Istiqlal nationalist party was in large part due to the transformative method of state-building envisioned
by the urban elites. The leaders of the Istiqlal wanted to see kinship ties and tribal solidarity replaced
with a stronger national spirit. They wished to see the tribal unit break apart under new “forms of
association based on social and economic interests as markets, schools, hospitals, and networks of
agricultural production” (Charrad, 2001). Leaveau (1976) writes, “The [Istiqlal] reformers’ guiding idea
was to destroy the tribal framework, that is, the ties of solidarity and obligation generated by actual or
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fictive kinship that maintained the cohesiveness of social groups in the traditional order.” The nationalists
desired the eradication of particularism, the abolition of customary tribal law, and the development of
national ideals which transcend familial and communal concerns. In 1952, the founder and leader of the
Istiqlal, Allal al-Fasi, published a book entitled, al-Naqd al-dhati (Self-criticism) outlining his vision of
legal, social and economic reforms for Morocco.3 Within the context of the time, his proposals were bold
and in support of broad social transformation. In 1955, a resolution was passed at a convention held by
the Istiqlal on the rights of women and children stating that it was “necessary to proclaim equality
between the sexes,” and that such equality should be “implemented in political and civil rights.”4 Al-Fasi
viewed the social preponderance of the kinship structure as deleterious to progress and as a source of
disharmony. He wrote: “The family, especially in some Berber areas, is sometimes so extended as to
encompass a large number of men and women, boys and girls, and to become a tribal faction; whereas in
cities, the family is more restricted, it is of the kind that is usually found in modern nations.”5 It is
important to note that the Istiqlal party and its leader did not support a secular state, and al-Fasi believed
that social transformation could occur under the banner of Islam. His support for a progressive family
law did not stem from his desire to advance the interests of women, but instead from a desire to destroy
the kinship structure that was so corrosive to the nationalist vision of modernization. Al-Fasi believed
that reformation of the Moroccan family structure was vital for the process of nation-building, and he
even made several legal propositions which would have worked to dissolve tribal solidarity. He argued
that marriage should be based on mutual consent between two people, and called for “the abolition of the
legal right of matrimonial constraint given by Islamic law to a woman’s father or guardian over the choice
of a spouse for the woman under his guardianship” (Charrad, 2001). He also supported outlawing child
marriage and setting a minimum age for betrothal. He wanted to abolish polygamy and to make it legally
compulsory for a man to compensate his ‘repudiated wife.’ Despite all of these proposals from al-Fasi
and his nationalist supporters, the systems of patronage and their influence over the monarchy prevailed
3
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in the end. The dominance of the traditionalists rendered the new state stable, and family law was
immediately codified after independence. The content of the law reflected the social vision of tribal
solidarity and the agnatic lineage.
The regressive Moroccan Code of Personal Status, also known as the Mudawwana, was passed in
1956 immediately following independence, and it adheres quite closely to the Maliki school of Islam, a
body of law widely followed by tribal groups in North Africa. The kinship model of male-dominated
bloodlines and the subordination of women was incorporated into the law and none of the reforms
suggested by the Istiqlal were included. The following is a brief summary of the content of the law.6
Marriage: The definition of marriage adheres to the Maliki school of law, making it a contract
between a man and a woman to make a family headed by the husband. The marriage is administered by
the male representatives of each respective family, with or without the consent of the woman. The only
requirement for the validation of the marriage contract is the presence of two witnesses and the payment
of a bride price. The presence of the bride is not required. While the law stipulates that the male
guardian of the bride has no general right to force her into a marriage, it states that she may be pushed
into a marriage contract if she shows bad conduct, particularly in the form of sexual transgression. The
judge has the power to rule that woman must marry even if against her will. Marriages between
Moroccan Muslim women and non-Muslim men are forbidden. The law departs from strict Maliki law by
setting a minimum age for marriage of 15 for girls, while the minimum age was set at 18 for boys.
However, a judge is given the power to grant permission for child marriage in special circumstances.

Rights and Responsibilities of Each Spouse: The husband is made responsible to support his wife,
and the wife needs the permission of her husband to visit her relatives. The wife is required to honor and
obey her husband and his relatives, to remain pure, and to look after the household. She is granted the
right to manage her own assets (from the bride price.)

Divorce and Repudiation: The law granted the man the right to divorce his wife without going
through the judicial system by uttering the repudiation formula (talaq) in front of two witnesses.

Polygamy: Polygamy was made legal so long as the husband was able to treat all his wives
equally. The wife had the option to request upon marriage that he refrain from taking future wives
through a contract, but the law does not stipulate any form of retribution or legal safeguard should the
husband breach the contract.
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Filiation: The law favored paternal filiation and defines legal filiation as that “by which a child
becomes part of the nasab of his father,” nasab referring to the male line.
Inheritance: The law preserved the inequality in inheritance promulgated by Maliki law, making
the inherited shares between men and women unequal, stating that “the share received by a man [is] twice
as large as that received by a woman.” The categories of heirs is strictly defined by the law and favors
distant male relatives over immediate female relatives.
The Moroccan case was characterized by a decolonization process which enabled traditional
forces to successfully capture the state and assert authority over the weak urban-based, modernizing
opposition. The departing French colonial power intervened militarily in the power struggle and favored
traditional forces by offering military assistance to the tribal hinterland. Morocco emerged from the
colonial period with a state dominated by traditional forces which reinforced sub-state tribal identities,
leading to the immediate promulgation of a regressive family law the same year that independence was
achieved.

4.2 Algeria: Clashing Personalities, Policy Gridlock and Islamic Revivalism
Algeria’s decolonization experience was devastating, brutal and prolonged. The French were far
more determined to retain control over Algeria than they were to hold on to their other North African
colonies because Algeria was considered to be an extension of France, with nearly a million French
settlers living in the territory (Prochaska, 1990). Lasting from 1954 through 1962, the Algerian war was
one of the most violent struggles for decolonization in the 20th century. Out of a population of 9 million,
between 1 and 1.5 million Algerians were killed during those years (Hermassi, 1972). At the time, 77 to
88% of the population lived in rural areas7. The French viewed tribal federations and kin-based networks
as a potential source of anti-colonial mobilization, and developed policies intended to break-up these
power structures. One wealthy French settler, the Comte de Raousset-Boulbon, stated in 1947: “If one
wanted to prepare the tribes for assimilation with France instead of reconstituting the government of
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Arabs by Arabs, would it not be wise to disorganize them..?”8 The colonial administration implemented
policies of “confinement,” “transplantation,” and “segregation” in the tribal areas to secure land for
French settlers (Abunn-Nasr, 1975; MacMaster, 1997; Prochaska, 1990 ; Ruedy, 1992 ):
Confinement consisted of occupying the most fertile lands of a tribe, then confining the tribe to a
restricted area. This measure left the tribes with a fraction of the land on which they had
previously lived. Transplantation meant that the French physically transplanted entire tribal
groups to another part of the country, usually to the south or to areas of poor arid land and then
occupied the tribal territory. The third measured, segregation, consisted of fragmenting tribes and
segregating the different parts in different geographic areas. In addition, French authorities
restricted the mobility of members of Algerian tribes, thus hindering communication among their
segments. In rural areas, Algerians had to obtain the authorization of the French military or
administrative official in charge of the area, before they could leave their village or district
(Charrad, 2001).

These policies fragmented local communities, disrupted local kin groupings and interfered with
customary tradition. Rene Maunier wrote in 19499: “Their societies [are] broken up, their unity
destroyed, their traditions swamped, their customary law obliterated… [This] means the destruction of the
tribal order, the dissolution of the ancestral group, which often forfeits even its name, even the memory of
its past exploits.”10 In total, nearly two million Algerians were placed in war camps and entire villages
were displaced throughout the course of the conflict. Although the policies succeeded in the short-term in
subduing the population through division and displacement, the overall effect was actually the
strengthening of kin-based solidarities and local loyalty (Charrad, 2001). The armed struggle and the
emergence of the Front of National Liberation (FLN) in the 1950’s quickly generated a strong sense of
national identity for all Algerians.
Although the FLN-led armed struggle was far less centralized than the Neo-Destour national
party-led resistance in Tunisia, the FLN was similar to the Neo-Destour in that it displayed broad social
and ideological diversity as an organized anti-colonial movement during the armed struggle. The
commitment to secure Algerian sovereignty from the French allowed a nationalist coalition with
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heterogeneous leadership to form. This coalition was successful and in March 1962, the FLN leaders
assembled at the congress of the Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne in Tripoli to formally
declare independence and discuss the future of Algeria at the Evian Accords (Stora, 2001). The Tripoli
Program11, the outline produced at the assembly, discussed leadership roles and proposals for a state
agenda. The authors of the Tripoli program were comprised of four elite intellectuals, Reda Malek,
Mohammed Ben Yahia, Mostefa Lacheraf, and Mohammed Harbi; all proponents of modernization and
socialist policies. The Program foresaw an Algerian state which would subscribe to socialist ideals of
collectively owned means of production, and also sought to encourage Algerian culture to be “national,
revolutionary and scientific.” The Program embraced Islam as a state religion, but only in its most
modern and progressive interpretations. Unfortunately, such rhetoric would prove to be irrelevant to the
real political challenges faced by the state, because just as in Tunisia, independence from France also
marked the onset of internal divisions. Ideological cleavages, conflicting visions of state-building,
distinct constituencies, and geographic chasms characteristic of the nationalist leaders materialized and
gave way to political conflict for many years to follow (Barakat, 1993; Waltz, 1995; Quandt, 1969). The
assembly failed to resolve power sharing disputes and procedures between political institutions. FLN
leaders scrambled for power, and the Tripoli Congress gave way to a violent crisis of leadership. Two
opposing factions, the pro-GPRA (provisional government of Algeria) and the anti-GPRA confronted one
another in a violent conflict in the summer of 1962. The anti-GPRA group headed by Ahmed Ben Bella
was victorious. However, elite divineness persisted in Algeria for years to come. Unlike Tunisia, where
military victory for the modernizers led to a unified vision of state-building, the anti-GPRA group had no
uniting ideology. Instead, “virtually all members of the elite ascribe the crisis of summer 1962 to
personal conflicts rather than to ideological differences” (Quandt, 1969). The anti-GPRA group was best
characterized as an unexpected alliance of individuals who shared some personal grievances but did not
have uniting ideological commonalities. One Intellectual who tried to mediate between the two groups
gave the following example of the “conflict of personalities”:
11
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Boudiaf and Ben Bella, after spending five years in jail together, couldn’t stand each other. They
would argue over anything- whether the tea should be served hot or cold, how much sugar should
be in it. It was just like a scene out of Satre’s No Exit. The crisis was simply a scramble for
power. Abbas backed Ben Bella because he was bitter over having been replaced by
Benkhedda.12

Importantly, the post-independence period of chaos in Algeria was not a crisis of ideas, a fact
which allowed for the continuation of a divided government characterized by some leaders that
subscribed to modern ideas and other leaders that subscribed to traditional ones. Ben Bella stated of the
victorious anti-provisional government: “I’m not wedding myself to their ideas, I’m wedding myself to
their force.”13 Quant writes of the 1962 newly independent Algerian government: “Without deep
ideological convictions of his own, Ben Bella could engage in this game by favoring, alternately, the
Liberals, the Revolutionaries, the Military, or the Intellectuals. Above all he would resist the emergence
of a single group which might become significantly more powerful than any other.”
A comprehensive Family Law in Algeria was debated and abrogated at least three times over a
period of two decades before it was formally codified in 1984 (Library of Congress, 1994). Attempts to
codify a comprehensive family law in 1963, 1966, 1970, 1973, and 1981 resulted in widespread
disagreement, causing the government to shelve the legislation each time (Borrmans, 1977; Saadi, 1991).
In 1963, a commission was appointed to draft a Family Code but the final version was too conservative to
be accepted unanimously. Members of government disagreed on issues relating to marriage, divorce and
polygamy and the project was abandoned. In 1966, the government shelved another draft of the law in
response to rumors circulating that the new law was “reactionary to the utmost” (Saadi, 1991). The
Minister of Justice stated on 26 February 1966: “These are rumors. For now we are only at the stage of
planning. There is no family code yet… We are trying to see how to come back to the sanest conception
of Islamic law to give it a necessarily progressive character and on that conforms to our ideas about
marriage and divorce.” 14 Other attempts after 1966 ended unsuccessfully due to such irreconcilable
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differences among elites (Charrad, 2001). The most the government was able to achieve was a few laws
setting the minimum age and requiring state registration for all marriages.15 Another decree in 1963
reintroduced the concept of male guardianship and also outlawed marriages between Algerian Muslim
women and non-Muslim men.16
In response to the oil crisis of the early 1980’s, widespread protests in the rural areas and the rise
of Islamic extremism began to take hold in the late 1970’s. The government adopted accommodative
state-building strategies in response to the growing power of traditionalist social forces in the hinterland.
In the end “the balance tilted toward conservatism after twenty-two years of hesitation and gridlock” and
the traditional elements of the divided government prevailed in the face of violence and economic crisis
(Charrad, 2001). Islamists gained increasing influence in part because the self-labeled socialist
government was unable to deliver promises of economic prosperity. In the late 1970s, Muslim activists
engaged in isolated and relatively small forms of protest: harassing women whom they felt were
inappropriately dressed and attacking stores serving alcohol (Library of Congress, 1994). In 1982, some
Islamist groups took their activities further when they called for the socialist government to be replaced
with an Islamic theocracy. After one incident on a college campus in which Islamists killed student,
police arrested 400 Islamists. In response, nearly 100,000 demonstrators marched during Friday prayers
at the university mosque; this in turn led to even more arrests. The government faced violent unrest in the
region of Kabylia where the Kabyles people had demanded state recognition of their local language and
culture. Similarly, but on a larger scale, was the “Berber Spring” of 1980 in which Berbers also
demanded formal recognition of the Berber language and culture (Koven, 1980; Anderson, 1996). These
domestic uprisings were exacerbated by the falling world oil prices in the early 1980’s, which
dramatically reduced an important source of government revenue and power. The rise in Islamist
fundamentalism began to pose a threat to the government, and it finally began to make concessions to this
increasingly important base of power. In 1984, the government opened one of the largest Islamic
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universities in the world in Constantine. In the same year, after twenty-two years of grappling over the
issue, the government also acquiesced to Islamist demands by codifying the Algerian Family Code. This
regressive set of laws “gave a privileged status to agnatic relationships within the extended patrilineal kin
group and kept women in a subordinate status…[the code] included a conception of the family as an
agnatic kinship structure in which the patrilineal male line had primacy and women were subordinate to
both husbands and male kin” (Charrad, 2001; Library of Congress, 1996). The following summary of the
1984 code17 is nearly identical to the regressive Moroccan code, with only a few differences.18 The
summary below focuses mainly on the parts of the code not found/as highly emphasized in the Moroccan
code:
Marriage: The concept of marriage is placed within the framework of the larger kin group and is
not defined as a contract between two consenting individuals. The woman is required to have a
matrimonial guardian (father or close agnatic relative) and is not permitted to marry without his consent.
Polygamy: The first, second, or third wife must be informed of the husband’s decision to take
another wife.
Minimum Age: A minimum age of 18 is set for women and 21 for men.
Divorce: The husband retains the right to exercise the formula for repudiation but the repudiation
must be registered by a judge. Women may, as the result of repudiation, be thrown out of the home with
no recourse or financial support. Women may request divorce under limited circumstances, which
include sexual infirmity of the husband or his prolonged absence.
Filiation: Defined as exlusively patrilineal. The child of an unmarried women has no legally
recognized father. Boys may be in the custody of their mother until 10, but this can be extended until 16.
Daughters may remain in the custody of their mother until marriage. Upon divorce, fathers always retain
legal power over children, regardless of whether the mother holds custody or not. However, one aspect of
the code which deviated from the strict agnatic kin-based model was the fact that women had the right to
retain custody of children upon the death of the husband.

Upon achieving independence, the struggle between the modernizing and traditional forces
remained unresolved, and neither side was able to successfully capture the state. The paralyzing tension
resulting from the heterogeneous political configuration of power holders led to policy gridlock, and a
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failure to codify family law for nearly two decades following the achievement of state sovereignty.
Finally, following the systemic shock of an oil crisis and economic instability in the late 1970’s and early
1980’s, the rise of Islamic revivalism and social unrest presented a threat to the state. Traditionalist
forces gained momentum and triumphed over modernizing forces. The traditionalist capturing of the state
thus resulted in regressive family law outcomes.

4.3 Tunisia: French Support for President Bourguiba’s Nationalist Camp
In the two decades leading up to independence, Tunisia was led by a nationalist, urban-based
party called Neo-Destour (Destour meaning “constitution” in Arabic.) By the 1950’s, ninety thousand of
the one hundred thousand members of the labor union belonged to the national party (Hermassi, 1972).
However, unlike the Istiqal in Morocco, the nationalist party in Tunisia was widely regarded as a leader in
the anti-colonial struggle and enjoyed nation-wide support from a diverse swath of society (Anderson,
1986). The Neo-Destour enjoyed strong support from the Tunisian labor union; as well as from
intellectuals, urban workers and tribesmen alike. It has been estimated that by 1955 one in three male
Tunisians were members of the party (Micaud, 1992). Unlike Tunisia’s two North African neighbors,
Morocco and Algeria, the urban-based nationalist party coordinated with the countryside to conduct
guerrilla-style resistance against the French. In fact, the number of fighters in the rural areas is estimated
to have been close to three thousand. Although, the number of foot soldiers may not have been
overwhelming, the coordinated resistance efforts of the urban core and the rural hinterland was organized
enough to pose a threat to the French colonial regime. The pronounced unity brought about under the
banner of the urban-based Neo-Destour party was made possible only by the presence of a collective will
to be rid of the foreign colonial government. Ideological differences were kept at bay and an emphasis
was placed solely on the goal of national sovereignty (Anderson, 1986.) Charrad (2001) writes that “the
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party leadership included liberal professionals such as lawyers and physicians who joined forces with
religious figures and graduates of the Zaytuna (faculty of theology). Following the rule of ideological
inclusion, the Neo-Destour incorporated within itself potentially conflicting tendencies…” Because NeoDestour had made French resistance a primary rallying point, as the colonial occupation drew to a close,
conflicting traditionalist and modernizing forces began to surface.
On the eve of independence, violent rivalries erupted within the nationalist movement and it
became unclear what type of government Tunisia would form following the departure of the French
(Moore, 1965). Two strong-willed leaders became chief representatives for the opposing modernizing
and traditionalist state-building visions. The modernizing faction of Neo-Destour was led by Bourguiba,
the eventual president of post-colonial Tunisia. Bourguiba had the support of the urban elites, the labor
union, graduates of the College Sadiqi, and most of the inhabitants of the coastal towns (Hermassi, 1972).
Bourguiba’s rival, Ben Youssef, enjoyed the support of a rural base comprised mainly of tribes located in
the central and southern parts of the countryside. His constituency also included those belonging to the
religious establishment as well as rural migrants living in the cities suffering hardship in the urban slums.
The two leaders represented the two most important party factions competing for state power in the postcolonial government. Charrad (2001) writes:
Two nationalist leaders symbolized the contending tendencies: the reformist Bourguiba and the
pan-Islamist Ben Youssef, his opponent who rallied enough support to pose a serious challenge.
Bourguiba and Ben Youssef disagreed on the strategy to gain sovereignty, appealed to different
constituencies, offered different visions of a future Tunisia, and had different outside allies.
Regardless of the ideological distance separating the two men at the start of the conflict,
Bourguiba’s and Ben Youssef’s positions hardened as each found a different source of support in
the course of the nationalist struggle. Bourguiba and Ben Youssef gradually became spokesmen
for different sectors of Tunisia society.

Bourguiba emphasized the importance of nation-building, while Ben Youssef underscored panArabism and pan-Islamism. In 1932, a newspaper piece published by Bourguiba read: “The Tunisia we
want to free [from colonial rule] will be a Tunisia for neither Muslims, nor Jews, nor Christians. It will
be the Tunisia of all who will want to take it as their mother country without distinction of religion or
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race.”19 In another statement in 1964, Bourguiba emphasized: “Whether one originates from Tunis, the
South or the Sahel [coastal region], one can only react as a Tunisian, that is with a strong sense of
belonging to the one and same family: the Tunisian nation.”20 With regard to French colonial rule,
Bourguiba was in favor of pursuing negotiations whereas Ben Youssef wanted to use force (Larif, 1988;
Moore, 1964). Pro-Ben Youssef fighters began to attack both French settlers and Tunisian Bourguiba
supporters, and the country entered into a bloody period of factional confrontation. In 1955, Bourguiba
and Ben Youssef parted ways for good when both leaders disagreed on strategies surrounding the anticolonial struggle.
In a move which greatly caused the Ben Youssef faction to fall out of favor with the French, Ben
Youssef “made a passionate speech in the highly symbolic setting of the Zaytuna mosque. Calling for
the birth of a new Tunisia as an integral part of a broader Arab and Islamic supranation, Ben Youssef
exhorted Tunisians to sustain the armed struggle in unity with Algeria and Morocco until the end of
French rule in the Maghrib” (Charrad, 2001). French officials subsequently offered military and political
support for Bourguiba, once it became clear that the colonial government would end its reign in occupied
Tunisia. The French were interested in maintaining ties with a newly independent Tunisia for economic
and security reasons, and disapproved of Ben-Youssef’s radical rhetoric supporting pan-Arab Egypt and
French colonized Algeria. In a violent, large-scale military operation, French troops annihilated Ben
Youssef’s guerilla supporters in the south, and Bourguiba’s modernizing faction captured the state in
newly sovereign Tunisia.
The dominance of the modernizing vision of state-building allowed the newly independent
government to swiftly adopt a transformative style of state-building which sought to pull out “the roots on
which Youssefism had prospered” (Bessis and Belhassen, 1992). In 1957, Bourguiba stated in a speech:
“I disagree with those who defend the old traditional principle according to which some freedoms predate
the state and take precedence over it… These freedoms must be banished if they jeopardize the
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collectivity and risk to cause the state to unravel.”21 Consequently, the new Tunisian state worked
aggressively to stamp out traditional kin-based solidarities through a series of reforms designed to weaken
tribal structures in favor of nationalistic ideals and modernization:
The targets attacked by the reforms included the collective tribal ownership of land, the autonomy
of local areas, the inheritance rights of agnates within the lineage, the independent power of
Islamic courts, religious property rights, and the privileges of extended kin in family matters.
Occurring all within a few years, the measures implemented the elite’s vision of a future Tunisia
as a modern nation-state in which the foundation of kin-based tribal solidarities would be
dismantled. The measures also cemented the defeat of the Ben Youssef faction and consolidated
the power of the national elite under Bourguiba’s leadership (Charrad, 2001).
The new Tunisian Code of Personal Status (CPS)22 expanded women’s rights and endorsed a
nuclear family structure over the extended agnatic structure characteristic of tribal organization. It
covered various areas of family law more comprehensively than the Moroccan code, regulating areas of
marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, adoption, filiation and some aspects of inheritance. The following is
a short summary of the CPS promulgated in 1956, within the framework of Islamic law:23
Marriage24: Consent from both spouses is required for a marriage to be considered valid. The
bride must give her consent to the state, and the matrimonial guardian is abolished. Marriages must be
registered by civil authorites.
Rights and Responsibilities of each Spouse25: The woman is required to obey her husband, and
the husband is required to show love and kindness to the wife. However, where is in the Moroccan code a
woman’s bride price remains her own, the wife is expected to contribute to the expenses of the household
if it is within her means. The law divides the responsibilities of the household between the spouses.
Minimum Age for Marriage26: The original code set the minimum age for marriage at fifteen for
women and eighteen for men. However, due to concern that Tunisian men and women were marrying too
young, lawmakers introduced a new law in 1964 which changed the minimum age to 20 for both men and
women.
Divorce: The CPS abolished repudiation27, making it mandatory for divorce to take place in
court. Both husband and wife have the right to file for divorce, either through mutual consent or
individually. Both spouses can be held liable for compensation and attempt at reconciliation is made
21
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mandatory.28 The original law defined adultery committed by women an offense, while adultery
committed by men was not grounds for divorce. In 1968, the law was changed so that both men and
women were treated the same in regard to adultery.29
Care of Children, Custody, and Adoption: The new law recognized adoption (whereas Maliki
Islamic law did not) and gave adopted children the same rights as a natural child.30 An individual
adopting a child does not have to be married. The original CPS stated that in the case of divorce, a
women’s son would remain with her until the age of seven, and the daughter until the age of nine before
custody was then transferred to the father. A new law passed eight years after the initial code removes
limits placed on the duration of custody granted to the mother, and stipulates that the judge is to decide
custody rights based on the best interests of the child rather than on types of kin relations.31
Polygamy:32 The CPS outlawed polygamy completely, stating that “polygamy [was] forbidden.”33
Taking a second wife while married is made punishable with one year imprisonment and a fine of
approximately 500 dollars, roughly the equivalent of one year’s salary for a Tunisian family in 1956
(Charrad, 2001). However, the law does not make a second marriage null and void.
Inheritance:34 This area of the CPS is the most regressive, due to the fact that the Maliki school of
law leaves little room for interpretation. The ordering of heirs and their respective shares are explicitly
laid out in clear terms. The agnatic relatives of the deceased are favored over immediate female relatives.
However, the CPS did attempt to reform aspects of the inheritance laws by adopting alternative
interpretations, specifically the Hanafi School of Islamic law on the subject of inheritance, and by
abolishing certain aspects of Maliki law. The Decree of 1956 and the Law of 1957 abolished the habus
institution in inheritance, which normally gives the deceased the option of donating the female relative’s
share of inheritance to religions institutions. The CPS made oral wills illegal and required wills to be
written, dated and signed by the author. Lastly, in 1959 the CPS adopted the Hanafi principle of “return,”
stipulating that should there be no agnatic heirs to receive shares of the inheritance, the remainder of the
shares be distributed to the first category of heirs.35 Hanafi law excludes women from the principle of
return, but the CPS altered this aspect of the principle and allowed female spouses to receive the
remainder of the shares in the absence of distant agnatic heirs.

In the case of Tunisia, the traditionalist vision of maintaining the sub-state power of the tribal
hinterland no longer had any political leverage in the post-colonial state. Due to the military intervention
of the departing French colonial power, the factional struggle between the traditionalists and the
modernizers came to an end with the Bourguiba’s camp emerging from the conflict as the unchallenged
power holder of the new nation-state. Family law was codified in August, 1956, only a few months after
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independence had been achieved. The reformist, urban-based party was committed to the transformative
project of nation-building, and a program of reforms designed to implement the nationalists’ vision of a
modern nation state impacted the codification of family law accordingly, leading to a progressive code.

4.4 Iraq: 1958 Revolution and Evolving Tribal Polices
Following WWI, Iraq was formally made a British mandate at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference
under Article 22 of the League of Nations. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was
characterized by deep sectarian, religious and ethnic division. The most politically significant divisions
facing the state were the Arab-Kurdish/Sunni-Shi’ite divide and the large urban-rural divide. However,
like many anti-colonial struggles, the wide spectrum of ideological, religious, ethnic and sectarian groups
displayed a unity of purpose against foreign rule (Dawisha, 2009). In 1920, the Great Iraq Revolution
(1920 rebellion) “was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time Sunnis and
Shi’ites, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort…The 1920 revolt had been very
costly to the British in both manpower and money” (Library of Congress, 1988). British writer and
political administrator in Iraq, Gertrude Bell, wrote to her father in 1920: “It is the uniting of Shi’ites and
Sunnis that is the unity of Islam. [Prayers] are sometimes held in Shi’ite mosques, sometimes in Sunni
mosques, and are attended by both sects. In reality, these meetings are political, not religious… and they
all evolve around the idea of enmity to the infidels.” Although the 1920 rebellion was a stunning and
unprecedented display of national solidarity, British policy reinforced rural-urban divisions and sub-state
identities throughout the duration of their mandate. In order to placate the majority rural population and
consolidate control over the country, the British favored policies which reinforced tribal autonomy and
social organization (Dodge, 2003; Sluglett, 2007.)
The Iraqi people were divided into two separate spheres each regulated by a distinct set of laws.
The urban population was subject to civil and criminal law under the jurisdiction of the Baghdad Penal
Code. The Baghdad Penal Code was created by the British in 1918 and was based on the Ottoman and
Egyptian codes, which in turn, originated from the French Penal Code (Efrati, 2012). The rural
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population was subject to a legal code created by the British in 1918 known as the Tribal Criminal and
Civil Disputes Regulations (TCCDR). TCCDR was officially incorporated into state law under the 1924
British mandate by King Faisal and “was based on a perception of an Iraqi society culturally divided
between a modernizing urban population and a traditional rural community” (Dawish, 2009). The
TCCDR legally endorsed the use of “tribal methods” and “tribal law” as tools to resolve local disputes.
The British granted official recognition to tribal chiefs, laws and customs, and the TCCDR “was among
the measures intended to bolster [the shaikhs’] position by prescribing their judicial authority over their
tribes” (Efrati, 2012). The British viewed the shaikhs as the “natural leaders” of the tribes and therefore
ceded regulatory and administrative power to them. The shaikhs were charged with protecting property,
collecting revenue and cutting off aid to Ottoman armies throughout the course of WWI. In exchange, the
tribal leaders were given support, arms and land. Large tracts of land were allocated to the Britishdesignated shaikhs, leading to the creation of landed tribal elites loyal to the British government (FaroukSluglett and Sluglett, 1983). Unsurprisingly, the social consequence of the TCCDR for women was
egregious:
As for customs concerning women, the British described them as particularly uncompromising
and harsh. They found evidence for this callous treatment in numerous tenets: women could
never inherit landed property; in the settlement of feuds, especially blood feuds, tribes required
the guilty party, in addition to paying blood money, to hand over one or more women from his
clan to the tribe or family of the victim for the purpose of marriage; a young woman was
compelled to marry her paternal cousin or to receive his consent to marry another man- and if
overlooked, the cousin was justified in killing the woman or the man she ultimately married; a
girl or a married woman- indeed, any woman- who “lapsed from the strict path of virtue” brought
a stain to the family honor that could be washed away only by her blood. Aberrations, when
noted, were usually explained as exceptions to the rule or as deviation from tribal custom36
(Efrati, 2012).

Thus, a major obstacle facing urban politicians in post-independence Iraq would be the powerful
tribal landed elites who maintained a separate legal code under British rule.
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Iraq was granted only limited independence in 1932. The domestic and foreign affairs of Iraq
were tightly controlled by the British through a puppet monarchy and use of the tribal hinterland.
Despite widespread opposition from urban politicians, state officials, lawyers and nationalist journalists,
the British did not abrogate the TCCDR, and instead worked to increase the power of the landed tribal
elites. A British report to the League of Nations on “the progress of Iraq during the period between 1920
and 1931” stated that “public opinion” in Iraq favored eliminating the use of local religious tribunals and
referring all matters of personal status to the civil courts (Efrati, 2012). The British did not believe,
however, that this “public opinion” represented the entire country and that such a move was politically
unwise.37 After Iraq’s acquisition of limited independence, urban-based nationalist forces began to
mobilize a revolutionary effort. Following a failed military coup by urban Arab nationalists (financed by
the German Nazis in 1941 at the start of WWII), the British reasserted their control by re-occupying Iraq
and implementing policies which strengthened the tribal hinterland and maintained the status-quo. The
British viewed the TCCDR as serving its purpose as “the cornerstone of the administrative building” 38
and as serving as “one of the most valuable legacies of the British regime” (Longrigg, 1953).
Efforts in the 1930’s and 1940’s to establish a unified personal status code proved unsuccessful
due to clashing views between conservative and reformist forces within parliament. In 1931, the Iraqi
government enlisted the Ministry of Justice to “collect and re-edit shari’a doctrines” pertaining to
personal status and then select and codify those provisions that “suite the demands of the present time.”39
When the draft was finished in 1933, opposition from religious circles claiming the legislation was
contrary to Islamic doctrine caused the draft to be shelved.40 In the late 1930’s, the Ministry of Justice
took up the project once again with the intent of proposing a law to parliament, but the project was again
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abandoned.41 In 1945, a third draft was presented by an appointed committee to the Ministry of Justice
and in 1946 the proposal was presented to the Chamber of Deputies’ Committee for Judicial Affairs. As
before, religious and conservative circles mounted opposition to the draft and halted its momentum
(Anderson, 1953). This pattern of clerical and religious opposition to a proposed bill repeated itself twice
more in 1949 and 195242 (Efrati, 2012). Religious clerics, both Sunni and Shi’ite, articulated their
opposition to proposed personal status legislation in letters and written appeals addressed to the minister
of justice and heads of parliament throughout the 1940’s (Anderson, 1953; Efrati, 2012). Most notably,
they singled out provisions regarding divorce which sought to restrict husbands’ rights and expand rights
for women. They opposed provisions granting women the right to separation through judicial
proceedings, and objected to the limitations placed on the man’s right to unilateral repudiation. In
addition to concerns relating to the legal rights of women within the family, opposition was also on the
basis of rejecting the state’s authority. It has been noted that “at the heart of the opposition from the
‘ulama’ lay their rejection of the state’s growing control over the legal system and its encroachment on
matters that had traditionally been in their hands (Efrati, 2012).
In 1958 a military coup finally overthrew the monarchy, opening in Iraqi history a new era for
social transformation and economic change. The 1958 Iraqi “revolution” was, in actuality, the work of
disconcerted young officers in the military. The Free Officers, as their movement came to be known,
were united by a desire to overthrow the existing regime. The resulting military dictatorship was headed
by Abd al-Qasim (prime minister and minister of defense) and Abd al-Salam Arif (deputy prime minister
and minister of the interior), both of whom had played large roles in carrying out the coup. The cabinet
members included liberals, Marxists, Arab nationalists, and Kurds committed to greater Kurdish
autonomy (Marr, 2004). The primary issue that divided the newly formed government was whether Iraq
should participate in the creation of a larger Arab entity with greater collective power to challenge foreign
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threats, or whether Iraq should focus on generating a distinct national identity. Although the new officers
were divided on how to prioritize these two state-building objectives and maintained personal rivalries,
they were united in their rejection of tribal and sub-state solidarities. Two weeks after the fall of the
monarchy, the “revolutionary” government abolished the separate legal status of the tribes by abrogating
the 1924 Tribal Disputes Regulations and imposed a new tax on the tribal sheikhs and landowners (Eppel,
2004). In addition, the Qasim regime abolished the 1933 Law Governing the Rights and Duties of
Cultivators, which released peasants from economic bonds tying them to their landlords and allowed them
to migrate to cities (Dann,1969). Additionally, without tribal opposition in a parliament, the military
government oversaw the codification of a new progressive Personal Status Law in December 1959. The
law set limitations on polygamy, eliminated child marriage, required the woman’s consent for marriage,
granted men and women equal rights of inheritance, expanded women’s right to divorce, eliminated the
husband’s ability to declare a unilateral divorce and gave the wife preferential custody of her children
following divorce (Efrati, 2005).
The Ba’ath Party came to power in 1968, and they viewed the tribes as an obstacle to both
political and economic modernization in Iraq (Nathan and Woods, 2010). In its Communique No. 1, the
Ba’ath Party proclaimed its rejection of tribalism: “We are against religious sectarianism, racism, and
tribalism…the remnants of colonialism” (Baram, 1997.) The Ba’ath party viewed the tribes as anathema
to pan-Arab nationalism and worked to reduce the Sheikhs’ power and influence. During the 1970’s and
1980’s, Saddam promulgated policies which marginalized and fragmented tribal solidarity. One
Revolutionary Command Council decree forbade the use of tribal family names (Al-Khafaji, 1992). The
regime’s deportation policy attempted to geographically divide tribal communities and dilute kinship
structures. Orders issued by Maysan Goveror Karim Hasan Rida guided the process of deportation to 1)
disperse and distribute large families to separate villages, and 2) to cover villages to which members be
deported with state security (Nathan and Woods, 2009). The regime not only viewed the tribes as
impediments for modernization, but also as security threats. A report issued in 1984 by the Maysan
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Governorate security Committee presented a report to the Office of the Ba’ath party which read the
following:
The village inhabitants of Al-Huwayzah marsh are connected by common tribal connections from
ancient times between the Iraqi side and the Iranian side…The marsh inhabitants on the Iranian
side are proficient in Arabic and Persian languages… which facilitates their exploitation by
Iranain authority to perform sabotage and spying actions.43

According to an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) memo, an assassination attempt on Saddam on 8
July 1982 by a tribal-based group of al-Da’wa party members provoked Saddam to respond with drastic
measures. He signed execution orders for the 148 suspected collaborators and also ordered the ISS to
detain the innocent families of the perpetrators. Nathan and Woods (2010) write: “By punishing the
relatives and family members of the accused, Saddam preemptively sought to wipe out potential
opposition to his reign…Saddam tapped into the culture of familial loyalty that runs deep through Iraqi
society and successfully eliminated the immediate threat.” Ironically, the regime began to consolidate
power by restricting political and military power to those of certain tribal origin. To avoid the powergrappling characteristic of party-based politics and betrayal, Saddam kept power within the Tikriti group
by entrusting it to his closest kin. In spite of the regime’s use of tribal affiliation to consolidate power,
however, its state policies facilitated fragmentation of tribal organization in favor of modernization and
the elimination of sub-state concentrations of power. The regime’s focus on distinct Iraqi nation-building
and social transformation reflected itself in women’s legal rights. The following is an analysis of the
most relevant provisions of the 1959 Law of Personal Status and the appropriate amendments made
throughout the duration of the Saddam regime44:
Marriage: The woman’s consent is required for marriage,45 sanity and puberty are essential for
the capacity to marry, and the legal age for marriage is set at 18 (16 with the special permission of a
judge.)46 The court has the power to rule over the opposition of the male guardian to marriage, thus
expanding the right of a couple to marry independent of the family. A 1978 amendment made signifiacant
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reforms to the 1978 code. The amendment permitted divorce through judicial proceedings for marriages
taking place before the age of 18 and without approval from a judge. Forced marriages were nullified if
not consummated and divorce was permitted in cases where the marriage had been consummated.
Relatives could be imprisoned for up to ten years and fined for involving themselves in forced marriages.
The right of a male cousin to forbid the marriage of his female relative was made illegal, sons were
forbidden from preventing their mothers to remarry, and fathers were prevented from allowing their sons
to choose a wife freely.
Polygamy: The 1958 law did not ban polygamy. Marriage with more than one wife was not
sanctioned without the permission of a judge and such permission could be granted only if two conditions
were met.47 First, the husband had to be financially capable of taking a second wife. Second, the law
required that there be some “lawful benefit involved” a stipulation which greatly limited the permissibility
of polygamy. In addition, the husband has to prove that he can treat his wives equally. A 1978
amendment punished men who contracted polygamous marriages outside of court with up to five years
imprisonment. In addition, the amendment gave a woman legal grounds for divorce if the second
marriage was entered into without the judge’s permission.
Divorce: The 1959 law imposed restrictions on a man’s ability to divorce his wife. Repudiation
was made invalid if uttered by a man who was intoxicated, angry or whose mental capacities were
questionable.48 Men were required to conduct divorce proceedings in court.49 Women were also permitted
to seek divorce through judicial proceedings on various grounds of injury, but more notably on the
grounds of familial discord.50 Grounds for injury included a husband’s imprisonment, his disappearance,
and inability to consummate the marriage, certain mental or physical illnesses, and his failure to pay
maintenance.51 The 1978 amendment additionally allowed a woman to file for divorce before the
consummation of marriage and after the return of all marriage expenses to the man. An amendment in
1985 to article 39 provided that in the case of a man divorcing his wife arbitrarily, or in a case in which a
divorce would be harmful to a woman, the man would be required to pay compensation. In 1983, Saddam
issue Resolution No. 77 allowing a divorced woman to continue living without her husband in his
residence for a period of three years granted she had not been the cause of the divorce. In 1978, husband’s
addiction to alcohol or drugs was also added to the list of injury justifying divorce for a woman.
Child Custody: The 1959 law stated that the mother had a preferential right of custody of her
children, a right which could be revoked should she be a minor, insane, untrustworthy or unfit for
responsibility.52 However, such a right to custody wa guaranteed only until the child reached the age of
seven, after which the court was responsible for determining whether the duration of the custody should
be extended. A 1978 amendement increased the custody period until the age of 10 and allowed extension
by the court to 15 before the issue would be re-opened by the court. A 1987 amendment granted that
woman’s custody rights would not be revoked in the instance of re-marriage.
Inheritance: The 1959 code stated that articles 1187-1199 of the Civil Code would govern the
determination of inheritance matters.53 The articles were derived from Ottoman law, which granted
female heirs and equal share to that of their male counterparts under all circumstances. In 1963 an
amendment restored the provisions of the Shari’a, making shares received by men and women unequal.
However, the daughter of the deceased, whether Sunni or Shi’ite, could exclude entirely more remote
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aganatic heirs from inheritance. In 1978 an amendment provided that if the deceased had no son, the
daughter(s) would receive the remainder of the estate after the parents and spouse received their shares.
Thus, the law eliminated the preponderance of the patrilineal, agnatic kin structure.

In the decades following establishment of the Personal Status Law, shifts in the power struggle
between traditionalist and modernizing forces in Iraqi society became reflected in the state’s
determination of the legal status of women. Following a 1963 military coup, the regime in power slightly
amended the Personal Status Law in exchange for tribal Shi’ite support during the regime overthrow
(Anderson, 1963). Most of the code remained intact with only slight revisions regarding polygamy and
the repealing of provisions granting men and women equal shares in inheritance. After the re-installation
of the Ba’ath regime following the 1968 coup, however, the regime fully endorsed the emancipation of
women as part of its project to build a modern and progressive society (Sharqi, 1982). It expanded
women’s access to employment and education, and also enacted policies which improved women’s legal
status. The regime weakened the power of kin groups, and the “integration of women into the new public
institutions undermined any competition from the Right, such as the al-‘Asha’ir (clans), who were
identified with the power of extended patriarchal families” (Hatem, 1999; Joseph, 1981; Rassam, 1982).
Following the 1991 Gulf War defeat, Iraq lost a great deal of its military and economic power.
Jabar (2000) writes: “Deprived of revenues, the state withdrew from social services, and salaried middle
and lower urban and rural classes were hit hard by hyperinflation and newly introduced heavy
taxation…The state, as an instrument of control and governance, sustained heavy damage: the army was
downsized to less than a third of its prewar level, the party disintegrated and the security services suffered
heavy losses during and after the March 1991 uprisings.” The March 1991 uprisings exposed the
weakness of the state’s security apparatus. The March rebellion was a Shi’ite-led revolt against Sunni
domination, Ba’athist secularism, and economic hardship brought on by the Gulf War. The regime
abandoned its transformative state-building policies in the face of strong traditional social forces.
Saddam expressed his change of policy in a meeting with military commanders:
Regarding the tribes, we are facing a new reality…We need to develop and enhance the potential
events to meet our needs. We need to enhance the people. We need to raise the confidence level
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in people, to make them useful and not side-lined…So what is the answer? We need to make
people feel that they are our people and therefore these people will fulfill duties without requiring
any instruction from us.54

Saddam rehabilitated a tribal-state alliance similar to that seen under the mandate system.
However, Saddam’s “neo-tribal” policies were far more extreme than the administrative techniques
employed by the British. Saddam sought to glorify tribalism as the ancient and timeless legacy of the
Iraqi nation. The post-1991 shift in Ba’athist policy consisted of elevating the tribes politically and
incorporating tribal lineages and symbolisms into the fabric of the state (Jabar, 2000). Saddam provided
the tribes with material wealth, resources, weaponry and political prestige. The reawakening of tribal
identity was illustrated by soldiers having to identify themselves by tribal affiliation (Baram, 1997).
Meetings between the President and tribal chiefs became commonplace and letters of support sent from
tribes to the Presidential Palace were publicized in the Iraqi media.55 In a complete reversal of the
policies he publicly advanced in the 1970’s and early 1980’s Saddam ensured that “the prevailing
traditions…among tribesmen should be respected and maintained.”56 The tribal chiefs received private
payments, large tracts of land and a range of light arms including RPG rocket launchers, mortars, and
howitzers. Baram (1997) notes that while the contribution of the tribes to state security was limited, their
“activities saved the regime the need to spread its troops thinly over the countryside.”
While the 1959 Personal Status Law was not officially repealed by the regime, legal autonomy
and extra-judicial tribal rule of law were again sanctioned by the state. In a significant expansion of tribal
jurisdiction, Saddam decreed that “all those who were pursued by the law and who sought refuge within
the tribal domain would not be prosecuted” (Dawisha, 2009). In addition to Saddam’s espousal of
vigilante justice and legal tribal autonomy, the regime itself also officially codified forms of tribal family
law. Saddam’s Revolutionary Command Council passed a decision in 1990 that exempted men who
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murdered their female relatives suspected of adultery from legal punishment. Additionally, Article 111 of
the Iraqi penal code exempted men from punishment for “honor killings” of women guilty of sexual
impropriety, including those victimized by rape (Baram, 1997). Another example was the prohibition of
women from traveling without the supervision of a male relative from the paternal side of the family
(Davis, 2005). In the economic and political aftermath of the second Gulf War, a process of retribalization of Iraqi politics resurrected the policy of tribal legal autonomy first codified by the mandate
system, and incorporated tribalism into the fabric of Iraqi identity and statehood. However, rather than
altering the personal status code, Saddam sanctioned extra-judicial regulation of tribal affairs and created
separate legislation under the civil code sanctioning the oppression and abuse of women.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Theoretical Implications and Complications
The findings of this study fit well into Migdal’s conception of the state as being shaped by social
and political elements that are not necessarily tied to ‘government’. The above cases, although distinct in
their respective paths toward the codification of family law, reveal a compelling pattern which holds great
implications for the region today. In each case, changes in the distribution of power helped tilt the
balance between modernizers and traditionalists, allowing one side to capture the state at the expense of
the other. While previous studies have demonstrated how family law is a reflection of institutional
legacies, societal-state alliances and styles of governance, this study suggests the importance of major
systemic shocks for family law, specifically, uprisings, revolution, and foreign intervention. The
decolonization experiences of Morocco and Tunisia were impacted by the direct military and political
intervention of the departing colonial power. In Morocco, the threat of the Istiqlal nationalists prompted
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the French to empower a tribal opposition in order to neutralize anti-colonial momentum. The military
support and political mobilization of the hinterland bestowed upon tribal leaders the upper-hand, allowing
newly independent Morocco to rapidly emerge as a state captured by traditional, sub-state forces. This
dominance was manifested in the regressive family laws of Morocco passed in 1956, the same year of
independence. Similarly, Tunisia’s modernizers were given the opportunity to immediately enact their
own vision of state-building once French colonial forces abolished the military threat of Ben-Youssef’s
tribal warriors. In the same year that independence was achieved, the Tunisian modernizers established
their bold vision in the form of a progressive code of family law that took precedence over tribal laws. In
Algeria, neither the traditionalist nor the modernizing forces prevailed until two decades following
independence, when Islamist revivalism generated social unrest and coercion. Street protests, attacks on
nightclubs, harassment of women, and political mobilization against the secular government generated a
sense of urgency for accommodative state-building tactics and caused the modernizing forces to
acquiesce to the traditionalists. Family law codification was delayed due to policy gridlock until the
domination of traditionalist forces and the subsequent formulation of regressive law. Similar to Algeria,
there was a long delay in the dominance of one group over another in Iraq because of the urban-rural
balance of power generated by the British style of colonial rule. Iraq’s modernizers finally implemented
their state-building agenda after the 1958 revolution, and fully consolidated power a decade later when
the authoritarian Ba’ath party ascended to power. Saddam’s regime utilized draconian tactics of coercion
in the 1970’s and 1980’s in order to implement policies of modernization. Family law was shelved by the
government multiple times until the ascendancy of military leaders with modernizing state-building
visions, resulting in the formulation of a progressive family law. It was not until traditional social forces
rebelled violently in the 1990 March uprisings that the balance of power shifted from Saddam’s security
apparatus to the tribal areas. The threat of tribal insecurity compelled the state to adopt accommodative
state-building practices through the glorification of tribalism and the devolution of power to previously
marginalized communities. As a result, the government both sanctioned extra-judicial, regressive tribal
law and codified regressive laws under the civil code.
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An important issue that arises from the case studies is the notion that the tribalist vision of statebuilding and the modernist vision of state-building may have areas of overlap. In Tunisia, the
traditionalist forces embodied by the tribal leader Ben Youssef were not restricted to the sole use of substate identities. Ben Youssef’s advancement of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism was rich with allusions to
national and super-national constructs. Similarly, after the 1958 revolution in Iraq, some military leaders
within the modernizing force preferred Pan-Arabism, as opposed to Qasim’s purely ‘Iraqi nation’
orientation. Finally, Saddam Hussein’s political co-optation of his sub-state tribal kin to foster loyalty,
prevent conspiratorial plots and consolidate power, was a calculated political move that ran counter to the
vision of a transformative nation-building project. Although these examples offer important nuance to the
proposed paradigm, the case studies illustrate one incontrovertible fact: modernizers seek to weaken substate identities and centers of power, while traditionalists seek to reinforce such local constructs. BenYoussef endorsed Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism while also fully supporting the continuation of
tribalism and kin-based solidarity. Elites in Iraq after the 1958 coup may have had distinct visions of
state-building, but such differences cannot be drawn along traditionalist-modernist fault lines. Both
ideologies of Pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism agreed, in the instance of the 1958 coup, on the abolition
of sub-state power structures. Finally, Saddam escaped the cycle of state-instability and military coups by
enlisting the loyalty of his kin, while also promulgating draconian policies of anti-tribalism in order to
modernize the country.
The role of state capture by traditionalist or modernizing forces in the codification of family law
continues to have important implications for modern societies. The case studies specifically illustrate the
importance of systemic shocks in the distribution of power among traditionalists and modernizers.
Systemic shocks tilting the balance of power manifested as social unrest from economic crises and
military force, affecting the codification of family law accordingly. Huntington (1968) characterizes the
modernization process as being turbulent, as a direct consequence of the tension between these traditional
and modern forces. In the past decade, social mobilization (Arab Spring), military intervention (2003
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan), and systemic military support of civil conflicts (NATO support of
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Libyan rebels) have demonstrated the ongoing relevance of the traditionalist-modernist dichotomy in the
North-African/Middle Eastern region. These interventions could tip the balance of power among
dominant power holders who hold conflicting visions of state-building, and have profound ramifications
on family law codification and the legal status of women. For example, the U.S. employment of tribal
fighters in the Afghan counter-insurgency is a military tactic which may tip the balance of power in favor
of traditionalist forces. In Libya, the identities and political aspirations of the rebel leadership receiving
external military support is unclear, and there is already evidence of a lack of ideological cohesiveness as
the new Libyan state comes to fruition. Diverse ideologies and visions of leadership emerging from the
Arab spring make the future state of women’s legal rights uncertain. Even in situations where family
laws have already been codified, the potential for repeals, amendments and alterations to the laws keep
their long-term effects unpredictable. The struggle between traditionalists and modernizers continues to
be relevant today and the consequences on women’s legal rights have yet to be seen.
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